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Abstract: The predominant spatial conception of the EU contributes to an evident emergence of  
a sharpened territorial building of the European space. By all evidence the idea of both the 
territorial cohesion and territorial continuity shows how relevant the notion of territoriality in the 
‘European discourse’ is and consequently how accepted the instrument of hard and closed border 
and the sharp inside/outside dichotomy are. Due to this pragmatic notion of territoriality, the idea 
of the EU as a ‘non-Westphalian new empire’ (according to the ‘neo-medieval paradigm’) became 
at least unrealistic. Its borders are getting more territorial, physical and visible. Hard border 
policies and practices on the Eastern and Western Balkan borders mirror the existence of a de facto 
barrier and of a deep ‘Westphalian memory’ in the way of using the territory as support of political 
unity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The removal of internal borders within the EU and the opening of a common 
market were accompanied by a continuous strengthening and by an increasing 
importance of external borders (Ibryamova, 2004). The creation of a common 
market with economic and social cohesion was followed by acts and policies to 
demarcate, border and protect the common European space (Geddes, 2001; 
Zielonka, 2006). In fact, also the EU’s concept of political integration, based on 
a rigorous system of inclusion and exclusion, defined by full membership status 
and fortified external borders became an instrument of the old conception of 
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territoriality. The Maastricht Treaty that entered into force in 1993 clearly 
established an increasing importance of the EU’s territorial basis. Even if after 
five decades of non-stop theorising about European integration, scholars are still 
concerned with the question of what exactly the EU is and what it may become 
in the future (Sidaway, 2006, p. 4), Commission officials clearly said that the 
dismantling of Europe’s internal borders made it necessary to make sure that the 
controls at the external borders of their shared territory were reliable (Islam, 
1994, p. 40).  
The EU’s system is characterised, much more than in the past, by a territori-
ally fixed political community. Several recent developments in the European 
Union, such as the creation of the Schengen area,1 the Lisbon Treaty,2 and the 
Frontex agency, show that the territorial concept, in a modern geographical 
sense, is still important and seems to evolve towards a polity with the 
‘Westphalian’ characteristics. The EU is now evolving towards a reproduction of 
the territorial model of modern state by presenting itself as being one single 
space and by bordering, disciplining and normalising itself with practices similar 
to those of nation-states (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008, pp. 362–363). Most 
of the member states wanted to move the Community towards a closer economic 
and political union. Economic and social cohesion became one of the pillars of 
the Community structure (Fitzgerald and Michie, 1997, p. 20). Due to the 
concept of territoriality related to a clear inside/outside division, the European 
project seems to evolve more towards a replication of the modern state structure 
than towards a form of empire.  
Europe has an intrinsic historical openness and cannot be understood with  
a definite beginning or end; it has never been a clearly demarcated continent or  
a fixed bordered entity and it has always been characterised by shifting spatiali-
ties. The Mediterranean once was a bridge of civilisations between Europe, 
Africa and Asia. Only recently it became a European periphery and a border. 
The EU’s eastern border is quite recent and it corresponds to that of iron curtain, 
even if it is located on a more eastern, new line. Nevertheless, the EU’s more 
frequent and widespread concept remains territorially based. Especially the 
spatial continuity is at the centre of the attempt to construct the European Union 
as a polity with modern state characteristics. 
                                                 
1 The new focus on the controlling of the EU’s external borders was also triggered by the 
Schengen Treaties (Albrecht, 2002, p. 1). 
2 The contemporary tendency towards an Europe with a Constitution, President, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and above all a clearly demarcated territory with a sharp inside/outside dichotomy, 
borders as barriers, is going on. It represents a project of a very restricted and closed EU (cf. 
Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2008, p. 361). 
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2. THE CONTEMPORARY EU’S NOTION OF TERRITORIALITY 
The prevailing discourse about the European spatial development is increasingly 
littered with references to territory, territoriality and territorial cohesion. Already 
in the Constitution’s provisions (Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
2005) the themes of territoriality and territorial cohesion recur again and again. 
The cohesion of its territory is explicitly posited as codified and institutionalised, 
something to be reinforced (Burgess, 2009, p. 148).3 Nowadays the European 
Commission conceptualises the EU as a demarcated area with a clear inside and 
outside, surrounded by a ring of friends (European Commission, 2003).4 The 
dominant contemporary discourse and metaphors on the EU’s political geo-
graphical nature are still clearly territorial. Despite the fact that at the beginning 
of the European Project the aim was to incorporate as many states and people as 
possible rather than to create a restrictive union, the EU is based on a conception 
of contiguous territories and territorial integrity, and it needs a clear understand-
ing of what belongs and what does not belong to the Union. The creation of  
a single space triggered a wish to demarcate and border the European political 
space and entity (Islam, 1994, p. 38). A new common external border became 
needed to protect the entire Union (Geddes, 2001; Harvey, 2000) and the 
external borders have been increasingly policed (Albrecht, 2002), representing  
a clear conception of hard territoriality. Concerns about the safety of the Union 
rose very quickly in the 1990s. It is difficult to deny that the EU is now  
a territorial structure with policing of its physical external borders, walls, 
hardware, and internal surveillance of the territory, strong immigration laws, and 
a protectionist economic policy, especially concerning agriculture. Membership 
of and belonging to the EU automatically creates exclusion, and it is necessary 
to remember that the right to control and deny admission of foreigners is often 
seen as crucial to a nation state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Leitner, 
1995, p. 261). As Colin Harvey (2000, p. 374) wrote, ‘supranationalism’ 
requires a process of boundary drawing just as much as nationalism.5 It is not 
surprising that the demarcation, bordering and securing of the common Euro-
pean space became the permanent conception of scholars, politicians and the 
media. Bordering is driven mostly by fear of crime and the need to be amongst 
‘ourselves’, hence protecting welfare, security and identity (van Houtum and 
                                                 
3  Among the objectives formulated in Title 1 is the promotion of economic, social and territorial 
cohesion (Burgess, 2009, p. 148; Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2005, p. 17). 
4  This document refers to the European territory as a clearly demarcated space, and uses the 
definitions ‘within and beyond the new borders of the Union’ and the concept ‘ring of friends’. 
5  Harvey (2000, p. 374) adds that a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the construction of the 
mechanism to ensure inclusion cannot be wished away, because it is the consequence of the 
ambitious aims of the EU. 
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Pijpers, 2007, p. 303). The EU aspires to become an international actor by 
extending its institutional power and superimposing its borders on the already 
existing state borders of European nation-states.  
The present conformation of the EU’s borders is characterised by rigid border 
law enforcement, borders controls (Andreas 2003, p. 78) and obstacles to the 
cross-border mobility. What still separates e.g. Central from Eastern Europe and 
Western Balkan from Eastern Balkans, maintains the aspect of a ‘modern state 
border’. This EU’s border pretends the territorial continuity and is ‘parasitical’ 
and ‘subsequent’ (it adapts itself to the historical subdivisions imposed by a long 
political occupation) and is ‘overimposed’ (it does not pay attention to the 
characteristics of cultural sights). Thus the EU’s territoriality is derived from 
that of its member states (Philipott, 2001, p. 17). The ‘exclusive’ and ‘expulsive’ 
character of the EU’s border, its impermeability, its function of rigid delimita-
tion of space and of ‘perimetral’ barrier, its superposing to existing state borders, 
can be defined neither as ‘post-modern’, nor as ‘imperial’. Even though some 
scholars regard external borders of the EU as ‘undefined external boundaries’ 
(e.g. Wallace, 1999, p. 519), these borders maintain a clear function of barrier. 
Pre-modern territories were characterised by variety, fluidity, non-territoriality 
in the modern sense of the word, or non-exclusive territoriality (Anderson, 1996, 
p. 141). The territorialisation of politics has been implied to be a long term 
process of the creation of the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ at state borders. Territori-
ality in the Middle Ages was characterised by an absence of clearly defined 
borders and sharp inside/outside distinctions (Anderson, 1995, p. 69). Further-
more, within an empire the relationships between territory and sovereignty are 
weak. The empire includes external relations without creating any sharp in-
side/outside dichotomy (Anderson, 2007, p. 19). Samuel Pufendorf in his work 
De statu imperii germanici (1667) argued that the Holy Roman Empire com-
pletely lacked a distinction between inside and outside. Indeed he wrote that its 
structure was ‘irregular’ and a kind of regimen monstruosum. In fact, due to its 
‘trans-territorial’ dimension (Ruggie, 1993) it was quite impossible to find  
a sharp division between ‘internal’ and ‘international’ dimensions. Hendryk 
Spruyt (1994, pp. 35, 51) noted:  
The medieval period lacked not only exclusivity but also territoriality. […] Federalism, the 
Church and the Holy Roman Empire lacked territorial fixity and exclusivity. […] The Empire did 
not define itself by control over a territory.  
One of the defining elements of empires is the absence of hard borders. Be-
fore the nation-state structure a non-exclusive form of territoriality prevailed, 
with many forms of personalised and fragmented authorities within and across 
territorial formations, with inclusive bases of legitimation. The main change in 
the political structure of Europe was the creation and spread of firm territorial 
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boundary lines between political formations. States were built around the idea of 
territorial homogeneity and unity. 
The contemporary EU’s border resembles neither the Roman limes, nor the 
medieval marche of frontier, generated by the complex tissue of historic Europe 
and created by the ‘trans-territoriality’ that distinguished it.6 The ‘linear border’ 
is a recent historic reality, characteristic of rigid territorial systems, and does not 
have the function of ‘filter’ but that of ‘enclosure’ (Newman and Paasi, 1998,  
p. 197): boundaries and territoriality are contextual. From the Roman limes to 
the Habsburg Grenze all empires have known only peripheral zones where 
settler-soldiers served as ever embattled ‘buffers’ for the imperial centre 
(Zielonka, 2002, p. 39). 
The modern characteristics of the EU’s external border stem from the attempt 
to sharply separate between internal ‘law and order’ of the internal space 
(Innenraum) and the outside dimension to which all ‘disorder’ is expelled. This 
is the typical logic of the modern state: the production of the ‘order’ inside the 
borders and the expulsion of the ‘disorder’ outside. The EU’s borders are 
evidently still characterised by a ‘Westphalian memory’ in the way to use the 
territory as support of political unity (Badie, 1995; Reut, 2000) and correspond 
to the modern idea of ‘political territorial exclusivity’ (sovereignty).7  
Furthermore, the EU’s political geographical imagination and the visions on 
the EU’s territoriality are dominated by an attempt to assure a ‘territorial 
continuity’ for the Union. The reaction to the same reality of the exclave of 
Kaliningrad into the EU’s territory remains emblematic even if self-
contradictory because also Switzerland does not assure the territorial continuity 
to the EU. Generally in this conception it is impossible to admit exceptions, e.g. 
enclaves and the territory of the EU must be continuous, without any interrupt-
tion. The same process of enlargement was regarded as an acquisition of 
contiguous territories, excluding ‘anomalies’. This conception reveals at least an 
imitation of the political model of the modern territorial state, even though at 
‘supra-national’ level. Only taking into account the more recent forms of 
empires (Habsburg or Russian-Soviet)8 it is possible to define the EU as a ‘new 
empire’ but certainly not inside a ‘neo-medieval’ paradigm.  
For many years Brussels pretended that candidate states transformed their 
borders into a more rigid barrier: otherwise the political ‘centre’ did not let them 
to enter in a Union based on a precise and continuous territory. This territorial 
conception caused through the years an ‘involution’ of the border and rendered 
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 ‘The archetype of non-exclusive territorial rule is Medieval Europe’ (Ruggie, 1993, p. 149).  
7
 ‘The Westphalian model of international political life presumes a notion of hard borders’ 
(Mostov, 2008, p. 20).  
8
 From the mid-16th through the mid-18th centuries, Russia and Austria were transformed into 
modernised empires with organisational characteristics of modern states but still multinational 
medieval autocracies in conception.  
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the borders impermeable (and certainly not ‘fuzzy frontiers zone’), letting fall 
institutionalised Europe into the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994). This process 
reflected the same conception of the creation (already existent in the cold war 
period) of a big self-sufficient, autarchic area, closed by a customary and 
boundary belt, which remembers the ideal of the ‘Fichtean’ geschlossene 
Handelsstaat (a political territorial, closed and mercantilist area).  
Although the EU’s territoriality is still less fixed and less exclusive than that 
of modern states (Mamadouh, 2001, p. 434), and progresses in a complex, 
multifaceted, and non-linear fashion, the ‘supra-national’ character of the EU is 
not enough to make different that unification among states, founded in Maas-
tricht, from other unifications that used modern borders as an instrument of 
building of state territory. According to Georg Simmel, borders have specific 
territorial functions: legal, security, social-psychological, and ideological that 
constitute the construction of political space. The EU is acknowledged to be  
a political hybrid which eludes conventional categories of national or interna-
tional political organisation, but regarding the external dimension of European 
territorialisation, it is becoming an actor involved in spatial ordering within and 
outside its territory. Of fundamental importance is the fact that the EU continues 
to display its greatest institutional strength along the territorial lines of the 
member states. The EU’s border seems a particular form of mark of territoriality 
used by governments to control resources and peoples, by making the bounded 
territory the primary focus of economic and political identification for citizens. 
The drawing of any given state or of ‘supra-national’ border represents  
a simplification of complex political and geographical problems. 
3. THE HARD BORDER POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
Instead of developing the spontaneous process of rebirth of a porous border as 
contact and trade zone to the East and towards the Balkans, which appeared not 
only possible, but necessary in the early 1990s (Layard, Blanchard, Dornbusch 
and Krugman, 1992), during the last 15 years it was tried to oppose a long, 
artificial process of tightening that produced the ‘involution’ of the border, 
which was made rigid and sealed by a system of visas, reinforced by the 
‘Schengen courtain’. The perceived ‘security deficit’ has increased the imper-
meability of the external border of the EU. Despite the fact that the Schengen 
Agreement’s implementation (after 1990) has had different effects for different 
parts of the EU’s external border, especially in the overseas countries and in the 
countries that are not part of the EU, hard border thinking and policy are 
emblematic of the EU’s conception of territoriality as an ultimate goal to 
achieve.  
The Contemporary EU’s Notion of Territoriality and External Borders 23 
The case study of the EU’s Eastern border is the most impressive. What has 
been a relatively ‘soft’, easily traversed border in 1992–1994 once again became 
hard. This border is getting more territorial, physical and visible. The expansion 
of the EU has involved a redrawing of the boundaries and relationships between 
the EU and its Eastern neighbours. The hardening of borders in the name of 
security acts to reinforce the division between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. It 
corresponds to an old form of territorialisation of politics and to a building of an 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ at EU’s borders. The distinction between ‘EU-members’ 
and ‘non-members’ is nowadays sharp, relevant and important (Zielonka, 2006,  
p. 12). This border is characterised by rigid border law-enforcement, borders 
controls, and obstacles to the cross-border mobility.  
As a matter of fact, the Welfare model is one of the pillars supporting the 
EU’s Eastern border and it is linked to an economy based on the ‘territorial trap’ 
that shows itself in a ‘wealth enclosure’ (van Houtum, 2002). This kind of 
political aggregation mix the model of interventionist (and distributor of wealth) 
state with the concepts of nationality and of citizenship and produces a kind of 
‘welfare chauvinism’. 
The new EU’s Eastern border has many consequences, mainly economic and 
political, but also involving future security risks, also for Europe. The most 
evident problems are those determined by the fracture – created by the border – 
of complementary regional areas. Because of the destruction of spontaneous 
transborder cooperation it may produce a degradation of the whole regional 
context.  
The political consequences of the border are evident. Countries excluded by 
the enlargement show serious problems with modernisation, a high degree of 
disorder and political instability, rising criminality,9 emigration pressures, 
populist-authoritarian regimes (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova), and dictatorial 
tendencies (Timmermann, 1997; Beichelt, 2004). These political systems are 
affected by bureaucratic exploitation, institutions and politicians locked in  
a bitter internal struggle for power, social disintegration, organised criminality, 
and state-owned land. Old oligarchies and obsolete structures flourish on 
economic stagnation and, as in the belt of the Western Former Soviet Republics, 
on the relapse into bounds of Stalinist ‘interdependence’, crisis and severe 
underdevelopment, from which it seems difficult to exit. The EU’s external 
border contributes to a volatile political system and deep political cleavages in 
the region. The existence of barriers, of filters continually renewed by ‘strate-
gists of border control’ (Andreas, 2003), raises the sense of segregation of 
excluded populations, the perception to be part of different reality (Kamann in 
Ratti and Reichman, 1993, p. 92) and the potential revolt against ‘included’ 
European countries. Moreover, European protectionism, using the border, 
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 ‘A hard border creates extra demands for organized cross-border crime’ (Zielonka, 2002, p. 1).  
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damages the prevalent agricultural economies of Eastern European regions 
beyond the border, impeding their development which otherwise is completely 
possible, because of their resources and immense potentialities, incomparable all 
around the world. Commerce with countries separated by the European border 
suffers from barrier effects and these economic activities cannot contribute to 
creating economic wealth. The frustration is high in the regions beyond the 
border. The inhabitants of these impoverished countries depend on travel 
westwards for survival. With the Balkans the EU has built a border that for 
citizens of former Yugoslavia is even stronger than during the cold war period: 
in fact even in that period they could travel to Central and Western Europe 
without visas (Batt and Wolczuk, 2002). Particularly the small developing 
countries that have seen the reduction of their internal market need to open 
outwards, otherwise they can fall into stagnation and decline (Pavliuk 1997; Batt 
and Wolczuk 2002), because of the high cost of autarchy. The economic 
justification of these barriers does not hold: it is not clear why only ‘internal’ 
openness of the Union within the frontiers of the EU can create advantages, 
while beyond these borders start disadvantages. The reality is that the border 
depends only on political justification, based on the political principle of 
‘exclusivity’. The border is regarded as an effective instrument to control the 
relations of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ market, impeding that escape from political 
control. The EU’s enlargement to the East has been done with the intention to 
create in Europe security and stability, economic development and cooperation. 
But de facto barriers may cause a spiral of insecurity and freeze deep disparities 
in Europe. The borders, at the same time zones of uncertainty and security 
(Sibley 1995, p. 183), can provoke polarisation and instability. In fact, the EU’s 
Eastern border maintains a destabilising effect within states left outside the EU, 
by exacerbating centrifugal tensions and pressures and may cause difficulties in 
the relationship between the EU and its neighbours. Trying to expel ‘disorder’, 
the EU’s border could stimulate it. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The spatialities, imagined frontiers of Europe have shifted over several millen-
nia. Paasi (2001) showed that different images of Europe and different narratives 
on European identity imply different forms and conceptualisation of spatiality. 
Different scenarios for the future of the EU are possible, but nowadays the 
building of the ‘institutional Europe’ still largely contains an old conception of 
territoriality and boundaries. This conception is related to the popular conviction 
that the EU/Europe has always been a fixed territory and that some European 
countries cannot belong to it. The Treaty of Lisbon also makes a step forward in 
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the creation of a territorial polity at the European level. The contemporary EU’s 
concept of territoriality contains characteristics of a neo-Westphalian model and 
there is no evidence that the EU is turning into a ‘neo-medieval’ empire. It is 
self-contradictory and highly problematic arguing that EU is a polity that 
evolves towards a weak empire or a ‘maze Europe’ with soft and flux external 
borders of ‘fuzzy’ nature, as e.g. wrote Zielonka (2006, pp. 6, 144) or to say that 
the inside/outside division is blurred because the EU’s authority does not stop at 
its own external borders (cf. Böröcz 2001, pp. 18–19). External borders and 
inside/outside dichotomy show the reality of the predominant conception of the 
EU that is based on the Westphalian clear-cut borders as well defined lines.  
Collaboration efforts across the EU’s external border, a kind of peculiar mix 
of regional, national/bilateral, and pan-European/supranational cooperation 
initiatives cannot be generalised. In any case, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) and soft policy instruments, such as Tacis and Interreg, are not 
enough to neutralise the ‘barrier’s effect’ of the renewed border. The demonstra-
tion lies in the underdeveloped character of the countries beyond the border such 
as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and so on. More ‘inclusionary’ initiatives towards 
the EU Eastern neighbours have had a marginal impact (Debardeleben, 2005). 
Along the EU’s Eastern border, controls and surveillance will not be loosened 
but, at least for now, intensified: it is a border without a good chance of disap-
pearing. But reterritorialising politics seems inappropriate to a new concept of 
Europe as ‘empire’. Reducing and resolving (or partly resolving) these contra-
dictions generally require opening the gateways and reducing the ‘barrier 
functions’ of the border (Anderson and O’Dowd 1999, p. 596). Nowadays in 
Eastern Europe is growing up the necessity of a deeper cooperation, including  
a visa-free-regime, a free-trade zone for services and agricultural products, an 
increasing level of people-to-people contacts, and closer cooperation in transport 
infrastructure. The increasing transnational flows of capital, products, services, 
labour and information have generated a growing need for border-crossing 
mechanisms. The rising of pressures towards the development of continuous 
spontaneous cross-border contacts confirms the existence of a push toward the 
recovery of optimal dimensions of cooperation, above all on the economic plan.  
Softening the borders encourages sustainable resolutions to ethno-national 
conflicts and socio-economic development. It could better protect or strengthen 
relationships and associative obligations through border or transnational net-
works. It offers a possible remedy to a politics of exclusion, facilitating global 
processes (Mostov, 2008, pp. 3–5, 17). As Anderson (1996) wrote, there is  
a need for at least a radical rethinking of political borders, of hard border 
assumptions and territoriality. Softening borders opens up alternatives for cross-
border linkages and new spaces of cooperation. The transformation of the 
modern concept of sovereignty calls for a rethinking of the terms of political and 
territorial associations. 
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